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The euro-area crisis has exposed deep deficiencies in the governance of
European Economic and Monetary Union. However, crisis prevention in, and
surveillance of, the euro area are not only the responsibility of European
authorities. As members of the International Monetary Fund, all euro-area
countries are also subject to regular bilateral IMF surveillance. The currency
union as a whole is also subject to regular IMF surveillance.
This report analyses the IMF’s surveillance of the euro area. We find that it suf-
fered from severe shortcomings in the run-up to the financial crisis, but after
the start of the crisis in 2008, IMF surveillance of the euro area greatly
improved, with the IMF correctly proposing measures to counter depression
risks and warning about banking sector problems. By the time the sovereign-
debt crisis hit the currency union in early 2010, the IMF was ready to play an
influential role. The slow European response meant this was indispensable.
This study is based on interviews with high-level European, US and IMF
officials, and on IMF surveillance documents, focusing in particular on the
situations in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and in the euro area as a whole.
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Foreword
The euro-area crisis has exposed deep deficiencies in the governance of Economic and
Monetary Union on two separate levels. One is crisis management and resolution. In
the absence of treaty-based mechanisms to manage and resolve sovereign debt
crises, it took several months – after the start of what was initially the Greek crisis –
for the euro area to put in place instruments which, although useful, are still proving
insufficient to extinguish the fire.
The second deficiency concerns crisis prevention. Although surveillance mechanisms
were in place before the crisis they failed to detect, let alone prevent, the build-up of
imbalances to unsustainable levels, even in the area of public finance, which was their
main focus. The failings of European surveillance have been recognised by the
European authorities, and are in the process of being corrected with the introduction
of new rules and procedures aimed at tightening existing surveillance and widening its
scope to imbalances outside the fiscal area.
Crisis prevention in, and surveillance of, the euro area are not only the responsibility
of European authorities. As members of the International Monetary Fund, all euro-area
countries are also subject to regular bilateral IMF surveillance conducted under Article
IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. In addition, although not an IMF member, the
currency union as such is subject to regular IMF surveillance.
In June 2007, the IMF’s new bilateral surveillance framework clarified that country
surveillance should focus on assessing if members’ policies promote domestic and
external stability. This meant focusing mainly on monetary, fiscal, financial and
exchange rate policies, and assessing the risks and vulnerabilities. Compared to EU
surveillance, IMF surveillance was therefore broader, because it encompassed not
only fiscal policy, the main focus of EU surveillance, but also external stability, the
once-traditional focus of IMF surveillance, monetary and financial policies. In addition,
the Fund was not bound by treaty-based procedures like the European Stability and
Growth Pact. 
Because of its broader approach and because it covered not only individual euro-area
countries but also the euro area as a whole, IMF surveillance was in principle better
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equipped than EU surveillance to detect the build-up of unsustainable imbalances in
euro-area countries, and to assess the risks they posed for the euro area as a whole.
In addition the IMF had two comparative advantages over EU institutions in terms of
surveillance. First, the risk of institutional capture was, in principle, lower for the IMF,
owing to its distance from European capitals. Second, the IMF had not only a far longer
experience of surveillance going back several decades, but also a much richer one
owing to the size and diversity of its membership. In particular, because of its vast
experience with crises in emerging economies, the IMF was ideally placed to recognise
that the kind of credit booms, large current account deficits and major external
indebtedness that arose in some euro-area countries would eventually lead to
significant turbulence.
Despite these potential advantages, we find that IMF surveillance suffered from severe
shortcomings in the run-up to the financial crisis. We cannot say with precision if these
shortcomings were more or less severe than those of EU surveillance since in this
report we only investigated IMF surveillance. It may well be that, despite institutional
differences, Brussels and Washington shared an equal blindness to unsustainable
imbalances, or an equal difficulty in convincing national governments to act when
such imbalances were pointed out to them.
Some of this blindness must be ascribed to the economics profession in general rather
than simply to European or global institutions. In the case of the IMF it is especially dis-
appointing that surveillance did not sufficiently (1) integrate surveillance of the euro
area and its individual members in a way that would have permitted the detection of
potential negative spillovers between national policies; (2) take advantage of its po-
sition as an outsider to criticise the governance of the euro area; and (3) question the
mind-set that ‘Europe is different’ and draw on its experience with emerging countries
that pursued unsustainable policies and suffered the consequences.
We also find that since the start of the financial crisis in 2008, the IMF has much im-
proved its surveillance of the euro area. It correctly proposed policy actions to counter
depression risks and warned about problems looming in the banking sector at a time
when Europeans were in denial. By the time the sovereign debt crisis hit the currency
union in early 2010, the IMF was ready to play an active and influential role in the
management of the crisis, the design of new crisis management and resolution mech-
anisms and broader reform of EMU architecture. The slow European response and di-
visions among member states meant the IMF’s unusual activism was indispensable.
At the same time we question the wisdom of the IMF continuing to play this ‘insider’
role, given the need for the institution to maintain a balance between all of its
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members. On this, it is useful to make the following point, although our study only
covers surveillance and therefore does not include financial assistance programmes:
in August 2011, EU countries accounted for nearly two-thirds of all IMF outstanding
loans, with the euro area alone accounting for 44 percent. These figures – which are
set to increase further as planned loan disbursements take place – are much in excess
of the share of EU or euro-area countries in the IMF’s capital, which makes them, in a
sense, net borrowers from other IMF members.
In such circumstances, it becomes all the more important that IMF surveillance of
euro-area member states meets the highest standards of objectivity and impartiality,
and is based on clear criteria. We therefore recommend that the IMF regains its role of
‘trusted outside advisor’ which requires not only some distance from its European in-
terlocutors, but also better surveillance, with the IMF fully exploiting its comparative
advantages and seeking better traction for its policy advice. In particular, we recom-
mend that the IMF better integrates its surveillance across policy areas and countries
within the euro area and better exploits its global position by improving its view of the
interconnectedness of policy challenges across the euro area and globally. This would
provide added value to the new, enhanced EU surveillance mechanism.
Some of our findings and recommendations about IMF surveillance are probably also
relevant precisely for the new EU surveillance framework. Indeed, although we have not
conducted a review of the pre-crisis EU surveillance framework, one suspects that it
shared some of the weaknesses of IMF surveillance identified in our report. In addition,
IMF surveillance has some features that EU surveillance is now taking on board (such
as the surveillance of current-account imbalances and financial fragilities) or may do
well to adopt (such as the surveillance of euro-area policies in addition to national
policies).
Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir and Guntram B. Wolff
Bruegel, August 2011
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Executive summary
This report provides an independent evaluation of recent International Monetary Fund
surveillance of the euro area. It focuses on the euro area as a whole and on four
countries severely hit by the recent economic and financial crisis, namely Greece,
Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
Given that this report is the first to evaluate IMF surveillance of the euro area, it begins
with a discussion of the institutional and economic framework of the surveillance and
the difficulties it creates. On the institutional side the report acknowledges that the
organisation of the euro area make surveillance by the IMF particularly complicated.
With no common external representation (and no IMF membership) and an internal
economic governance at three different levels (national, euro area and EU), the euro
area is a complex entity. Regular IMF surveillance, conducted through Article IV reports,
therefore involves a euro-area report addressing euro area and EU policies, and
individual euro-area country reports covering national policies. On the economic side,
surveillance is made difficult by the traditional focus of IMF surveillance on nominal
exchange rates as the main channel through which external stability, the ultimate goal
of surveillance, can be endangered. Overall, the IMF has not yet found a way to ensure
the desirable degree of consistency between its euro area-wide and national reports.
Against this background, the report assesses IMF surveillance of the euro area before
the economic and financial crisis erupted in full force in September 2008 and
afterwards.
As far as the period before the crisis is concerned the report finds that:
• The IMF issued a number of strong and relevant policy recommendations, whose
follow-up was unfortunately not always ensured.
• In general IMF surveillance was process-driven rather than analysis-driven, with
insufficient integration of national and euro area-wide analyses and
recommendations. As a result, it often failed to identify spillovers between euro-
area countries.  
• Rather than fully exploiting its comparative advantage based on its international
experience in crisis-prone countries, the IMF fell victim to a 'Europe is different'
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mindset and failed to address issues such as divergence of unit labour costs,
capital flows and the resulting large imbalances in country-level current-accounts. 
• Eagerness to play a role in the complex European policy process reduced the IMF’s
effectiveness as an independent and critical observer of the euro area.
Vulnerabilities that proved to be consequential after the crisis erupted were not
always spotted beforehand. When they were, the Fund often failed to keep the focus
on them and to press forcefully for policy responses. 
• In general, IMF surveillance failed to take fully into account the implications of being
in a currency union both for national policies and for the governance of the euro
area, whose weaknesses were not fundamentally criticised. However, the Fund
correctly identified some weaknesses of the European integration process, most
notably of the EU financial supervision and resolution framework.  
Regarding surveillance of the euro area during the 2008-10 crises, the report finds
that:
• IMF surveillance became much more intense. Regular surveillance also became
more relevant, although it continued to suffer some weaknesses, in particular the
division between euro area-wide and national Article IV reports. 
• Besides conducting regular surveillance, the IMF provided advice to national and
euro-area authorities in real time and at an accelerated pace as the crisis unfolded,
quickly recognising the nature and magnitude of the problems facing the euro area
and abandoning earlier complacency.
• The Fund rightly assessed the magnitude of the economic downturn and urged a
strong macroeconomic response. However, it did not sufficiently differentiate the
advice for fiscal stimulus across countries, thereby contributing to later
vulnerabilities, in particular in Spain.
• The Fund early on advocated a vigorous response to deal with distressed banks.
This was a positive contribution to the debate in Europe, which was slow to address
the issue.
• The Fund was an important contributor in the search for a crisis management and
resolution framework by pushing for more comprehensive and bolder solutions.
• In the debate on the reform of the governance of EMU, the Fund contributed on
some issues but was not a major contributor to the rethink of the European policy
framework.
The report makes a number of recommendations to improve IMF surveillance of the
euro area:
• The IMF surveillance mandate for currency unions needs to be re-interpreted in
order to recognise that instability in a currency union involves other channels than
2
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the nominal exchange rate, the normal channel in surveillance of IMF members. A
revision of the 2007 decision on surveillance would help in this respect, but there
is room for improvement within the existing legal framework.  
• The IMF’s relationship with the euro area should be redefined. The Fund should take
notice of the EU’s institutional constraints but should not be bound by them. It
should gradually give up the role of a major player in the euro area institutional
game adopted at the height of the sovereign debt crisis, and revert to its normal role
of trusted external advisor, including on euro area institutional reforms.   
• IMF surveillance should be restructured in order to improve the consistency of
national and euro area-wide surveillance and ensure better effectiveness. In
particular the euro area Article IV report should be done away with and replaced by
a Euro Area Surveillance Report (EASR) combining the main results of the national
Article IV reports and of the euro area mission. It should address all major intra
euro-area spillovers and examine linkages between the euro area and the rest of
the world.
• The EASR would be an important factor in ensuring better traction for IMF advice to
the euro area and its member countries.
• Financial-sector surveillance and risk assessment should feature prominently in
national Article IV reports and in the EASR.
3
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1. Georg Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Frankfurt/Main, 1972, S. 14, original published in
1821. In English: “...the Owl of Minerva takes flight only as the dusk begins to fall”.
2. The purpose follows the agreed terms of reference.
3. Watson (2008).
4. The euro-area Article IV is technically not an Article IV in its own rights.
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1. Introduction
„... die Eule der Minerva beginnt erst mit der einbrechenden Dämmerung ihren Flug.“1
1 The purpose of this report is to provide an independent view of the Fund’s
surveillance of the euro area in recent years, with a particular focus on the euro
area as a whole and on the countries that ended up either requesting financial
assistance from the Fund (Greece, Ireland, Portugal) or were adversely affected by
bond market developments (Spain). The aim is to assess IMF surveillance of the
euro area and of its individual member states in the run-up to the global financial
crisis and during the period 2008-10. Special focus is placed on how the Fund took
into account the implications of currency union membership2.
2 This report is the first attempt to evaluate the IMF’s surveillance of the euro area
and of a currency union. The 2008 Triennial Review included a review of IMF
surveillance of the European Union in general, but not focusing on the euro area
specifically3. The Independent Evaluation Office has not yet produced a report
specifically on the euro area. For this reason our report also touches upon the
institutional framework of the euro area itself and IMF surveillance of currency
unions, and examines how these two frameworks interact with one another.
3 Effective surveillance of the euro area is made difficult by the complicated
institutional set-up of the euro area, and the IMF has to cope with this difficulty.
The euro area is a unique construction, with a complex decision-making process
involving numerous actors. While monetary policy is in the hands of one central
authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), national authorities are in charge of
most other policies, which are coordinated by different Council formations. The
euro area as such is not a member of the IMF but all its members are. However
regular IMF surveillance through Article IV consultations and reports covers both
individual member states and the euro area4.
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4 Our assessment of IMF surveillance takes into account the effectiveness of
communication to national and euro-area authorities. An important part of
effective surveillance, besides the analysis and appropriateness of
recommendations, concerns the effectiveness with which recommendations are
transmitted to authorities and trigger a policy debate among recipient
policymakers and the wider policy community. This issue is of particular relevance
for the euro area, because its complex governance and the overlap of
responsibilities make it difficult for the IMF to effectively deliver advice and trigger
action at the euro-area and national levels.
5 Our assessment does not, however, explore to what extent IMF advice was followed
in terms of policy action by the recipient authorities. An important issue when
assessing the overall impact of surveillance should be to examine to what extent
national and euro-area policymakers take on board and act on advice given to
them. Unfortunately, the evaluation of actual policy response could not be done
within the short time frame given to the authors of this study.
6 Economic policy mistakes are easier to spot with the benefit of hindsight than in
real time. Just as the owl of Minerva comes too late to warn, some of our criticisms
of Fund surveillance are made possible by the fact that some issues now fully in the
open were difficult to monitor in real time. Some data are also more accurate today
than they were at the time when surveillance was carried out. Some of our
criticisms may therefore sound unfairly harsh to those who were trying to give the
best policy advice possible in real time. Although we are fully aware of our
informational advantage, we deem it nevertheless important to highlight where
policy recommendations proved to be right or wrong given the state of our
knowledge today. When possible, we tried to assess to what extent policy
recommendations were appropriate or not on the basis of information available at
the time.
7 The report is meant to cover IMF surveillance during the period 2008-10. However,
we have gone back to earlier documents to assess if vulnerabilities that came to the
fore in the period 2008-10 had been already detected in earlier documents.
8 This report examines IMF surveillance in a broad sense, as carried out through the
usual institutional channels and through more informal channels. Formal channels
include both multilateral reports (especially the World Economic Outlook and Global
Financial Stability reports) and bilateral reports (especially Article IV reports and
Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) reports). Informal channels
include initiatives taken by Fund management to convey policy messages to
national and European authorities, which grew in importance after the beginning
of the economic and financial crisis in September 2008.
9 Our assessment is based on published and unpublished written material as well
as on interviews at the IMF and in Europe. To form a comprehensive view, we
analysed the published Article IV and multilateral surveillance documents as well
as those unpublished documents that were made available to us. Moreover, we
interviewed a large number of IMF staff, management and executive directors, as
well as senior policymakers throughout Europe and the US.
10 The amount of material available for us to examine was extremely large. It was
necessary for us to focus on a limited number of key episodes of economic
policymaking in the euro area. This particularly applies to the 2008-10 period, when
a significant part of IMF surveillance took place through interaction with
policymakers outside the regular Article IV surveillance process.
11 The report is structured as follows. The next section reviews the IMF surveillance
mandate, in particular with respect to the euro area. Section 3 assesses the per-
formance of IMF surveillance in identifying and warning about risks in the run-up
to the crisis, before the Lehman Brothers collapse. Section 4 assesses IMF advice
on a number of key economic policy issues during the crisis. Section 5 concludes
with a number of proposals on how to improve IMF surveillance of the euro area.
6
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2. Legal and institutional issues
surrounding IMF surveillance
12 The two main modalities of IMF surveillance are multilateral and bilateral. The first
refers to the Fund’s responsibility to oversee the international monetary system
and the second to its responsibility to oversee the compliance of each member
with its obligations under the Articles of Agreement. As a large entity with a
significant role in the global economy and within the international monetary
system, the euro area is subject to both multilateral and bilateral surveillance. In
practice, multilateral surveillance takes place mostly through the publication of
Fund reports. The Fund has two main flagship publications, the World Economic
Outlook (WEO) and the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR). Recently, the Fiscal
Monitor was added as a global flagship publication. For the euro area, the bi-annual
Regional Economic Outlook (REO) for Europe complements the WEO/GFSR, even
though it is not strictly speaking part of surveillance. Bilateral surveillance centres
on Article IV consultations and discussions of the IMF Executive Board of a staff
report5.
13 Legal provisions for surveillance emphasise the exchange rate as a channel of in-
teraction with the rest of the world. Article IV specifies the obligations of members
with respect to exchange rate stability in order to fulfill “the essential purpose of the
international monetary system [which] is to provide a framework that facilitates
the exchange of goods, services, and capital among countries, and that sustains
sound economic growth.” Section (1) spells out in some detail the general obliga-
tions of members. It indicates that they include conducting their “economic and fi-
nancial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly economic growth with
reasonable price stability” and promoting stability “by fostering orderly underlying
economic and financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to
produce erratic disruptions”. These two requirements are generally referred to as
aiming at domestic stability. Furthermore, and importantly, the same section of
Article IV indicates that IMF members “avoid manipulating exchange rates or the in-
7
5. Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement defines the obligations of IMF Members.
6. The distinction between domestic and external stability is however not explicitly made in the Articles of Agreement.
7. IMF (2007) ‘Review of the 1977 Decision – Proposal for a new decision’, companion paper, May 22.
BOX 1: ARTICLE IV MISSIONS
Article IV of the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement forms the legal
basis of its formal surveillance mandate. Although this surveillance leads to the
systematic publication of many high-visibility reports and publications, it is a
continuous process involving regular interaction with authorities.
Article IV Consultations are the main tool through which the IMF operationalises its
bilateral surveillance mandate with the aim of evaluating and advising on the
economic policies of each member state. In principle, Article IV Consultations follow
IMF SURVEILLANCE OF THE EURO AREA AN EVALUATION
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ternational monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments
adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage” and “follow exchange poli-
cies compatible with their undertakings under Article IV, Section 1”. This require-
ment refers specifically to the exchange rate and the balance of payments, in other
words external stability6. Section (3) forms the basis of bilateral surveillance, giv-
ing the Fund the responsibility to oversee the compliance of each member with
their general obligations.  Box 1 discusses what an Article IV mission involves.
14 The IMF executive board adopted a new decision on bilateral surveillance over
members’ policies in 2007. Under the new decision, the concept of external
stability explicitly became the overarching principle of surveillance. The 2007
decision corrected the previously exclusive focus on exchange-rate policy and
instead promoted a broader concept of external stability. Domestic stability was
designated as an objective in itself and as a necessary condition for external
stability. External stability was further defined in a companion paper and the
Executive Board endorsed the following definition7: external stability has been
achieved when the balance of payments position does not, and is not likely to, give
rise to disruptive adjustments in exchange rates. A balance of payments position
is broadly in line with its equilibrium, according to the companion paper, when the
“(i) underlying current account is broadly in line with its equilibrium (which (...) is
equivalent to there being no fundamental exchange rate misalignment), and (ii)
the capital and financial account does not create risks of abrupt shifts in capital
flows”. In other words, the assessment of the balance of payments flows should
also take into account the stocks, in particular the net external asset position.
Thus, the assessment should consider the current account as well as the capital
and financial accounts.
a twelve-month cycle, even though longer consultation cycles are also possible
under certain conditions. The periodic reviews that are carried out for countries
under an IMF programme are distinct from the Article IV Consultation process. 
There are typically three stages in an Article IV Consultation: (1) a preparation phase,
taking place mostly within the Fund itself, (2) the Article IV Mission, consisting of a
staff visit to the country under surveillance and ending with a Concluding Statement,
and (3) preparation of reports for management and the Executive Board. The
culmination of this last stage is the discussion of the staff report by the Executive
Board, and its publication if the member country agrees. Several documents are
produced during each of these stages, though only the final Staff Report and the
staff’s concluding statement are often made public.
The preparation phase
The Article IV Consultation process begins with the preparation of a Draft Policy Note
by the relevant area department, which leads the process. Information collected as
part of the continuous surveillance process, discussions with other Fund depart-
ments and early consultations with the country authorities provide the material for
the Draft Policy Note. This incorporates a preliminary analysis of the country’s eco-
nomic situation and policies, and outlines the Fund’s proposed positions on major
issues. Having been submitted to management for approval, the document is cleared
by the Strategy, Policy and Review (SPR) department of the IMF. The final Policy Note
provides a summary analysis of the economic situation and sets the agenda.
The Article IV Mission
During the Article IV Mission, a small team of IMF staff members visits the country
for a period of approximately two weeks. The team is headed by a senior staff
member, the Mission Chief, from the relevant area department. The other members
of the Mission team are selected from the area department and the functional
departments depending on the issues requiring special attention (a country with
budgetary troubles, for example, could expect a staff member from the Fiscal Affairs
Department). In general, a Mission team comprises four to six people. 
The Article IV Mission consists of meetings with policy makers and officials,
academics and think tanks, and representatives of the private sector and civil
society (such as trade unions), depending on the issues under scrutiny. The primary
contact is often the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank. The meetings are
IMF SURVEILLANCE OF THE EURO AREA AN EVALUATION
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designed to collect and verify information and statistical data and acquire through
discussions a deeper understanding of policy issues and objectives. During this
process, the Mission team presents the IMF’s view on what the most pressing policy
questions are and provides advice on how to address them. At the end of the Mission,
the Fund may publish a ‘Concluding Statement’ summarising its views and
recommendations.
The final stage
Following the Article IV Mission, the Mission team prepares the Staff Report for the
Executive Board. This report, after having been cleared by the Executive Board and
after removal of market-sensitive information or information that may reveal
policies prematurely, is what is commonly referred to as the ‘Article IV’. Its exact
structure changes with time and the country under surveillance. In general, however,
it contains the following sections:
• An Executive Summary;
• Context: short summary of the current economic situation (focus on short-term
issues);
• The Economic Outlook: detailed presentation of the economy, often containing a
large number of charts and figures. The presentation may be organised by topic;
• Policy Discussion: policy recommendations derived from the analysis in the
preceding section. This section tends to be more theoretical than the Economic
Outlook. It may also be organised by topic;
• Staff Appraisal: this section, which often forms the basis of the Executive
Summary, presents the IMF staff’s overall appraisal and policy advice.
Before publication, the report is discussed in depth by the Fund’s Executive Board.
Most, if not all, of the Executive Directors will express their positions with respect to
the Fund’s appraisal and highlight issues for discussion. At the end of the Executive
Board discussion, a ‘Summing Up’ – containing the Board’s views, including
disagreements – is prepared for approval before being transmitted to the country
under surveillance. This document forms the basis, along with the main Report, for
the ‘Public Information Notice’ that is released at the same time. The minutes of the
Executive Board Meeting, however, are not made public.
Note: This box draws on official IMF documents and: Arriazu, Crow, Thygesen (1999) External
evaluation of IMF surveillance: report by a group of independent experts, International Monetary Fund,
Washington DC
8. There were some attempts in the direction, for example a call to several countries to introduce fiscal councils to
foster self-compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact. These initiatives were, however, partial at best.
9. Real effective exchange-rate developments based on inflation data were discussed in national Article IVs, though
not systematically.
10. See IMF (2007), ibid (p8) and also IMF (1998) The European Economic and Monetary Union and the International
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15 Within this framework, surveillance of the euro area raises two types of difficulties.
One is institutional: the euro area as such is not a member of the Fund, whereas
constituent member countries are. This is important from a legal standpoint, but
also because surveillance is a collaborative process based on dialogue between
Fund staff and national authorities – as mentioned in one interview for this report,
“it takes two to do surveillance”. The solution here is that bilateral Article IV
consultations are conducted with all euro-area member states and are
supplemented by discussions with EU institutions responsible for common policies
in the area. The Fund started conducting euro area-wide Article IV missions in 1999
with the aim of monitoring monetary and exchange rate policy. Consistent with
legal constraints, the IMF Decisions No. 11846-(98/125), 12899-(02/119),
14062 (08/15) state that results from euro-area surveillance are an integral part
of the surveillance of the individual member states. In practice, however, the
surveillance processes and documents were not integrated8. National Article IV
reports continued to constitute the core of the IMF’s surveillance. The focus of the
euro-area surveillance was ECB policy and discussions with the European
Commission on broad economic policies, including in the areas of macroeconomics,
trade and competition policy, and on issues related to the Stability and Growth Pact
and the financial supervisory framework. The euro-area Article IV documents rarely
discuss national problems that could have significant implications for the euro area
in aggregate, as national discussions are part of the national Article IVs. At the
same time, monetary and exchange rate developments ceased to be part of the
national Article IVs9. In effect, surveillance was split into two parts: one addressing
policies conducted by euro-area authorities, and one addressing national policies.
In the process, the issue of overall consistency and spillovers within the euro-area
fell out of sight.
16 The other difficulty is economic in nature: members of the euro area no longer have
a nominal exchange rate, and the euro area is not directly responsible for policies
aiming at domestic stability. The problem was directly addressed on the occasion
of the 2007 decision. For the euro area, as for other currency unions, it was decided
that external stability would be assessed at the level both of the currency union as
a whole and of its individual members. According to this approach, members of a
currency union have the same obligations under Article IV as all Fund members,
even though they have delegated certain policies to union-level institutions10.
Monetary Fund – Main issues relating to rights and obligations of EMU Members in the Fund: “When conducting
surveillance, the Fund considers the policies of the union-level institutions as being conducted on behalf of the
currency union’s members”.
11. Ibid and IMF (2005) Fund surveillance over members of a currency union, 21 December 2005.
12. IMF (2007), ibid., p11, paragraph 25.
13. “Surveillance at the level of individual currency union members examines their domestic policies and assesses
the extent to which these policies promote their own domestic stability, which in turn fosters the domestic and
external stability of the union” (2007 companion paper). The focus on external stability may have rendered intra-
currency area imbalances not of primary concern. At the extreme, the current crisis for example could be
considered of little relevance to IMF surveillance. Indeed, the euro-area exchange rate is stable and euro-area
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External stability of a currency union is to be assessed as a function of both the
exchange-rate policies of the union and of the domestic policies of its members. The
Article IV consultations in a currency union therefore involve a combination of
bilateral discussions with individual member states on the policies conducted at
their level as well as discussions with union-level institutions for the common
policies for which they are responsible11.
17 The balance of payments at a country level remains an element of surveillance
but the acceptable threshold was increased. It was decided that in view of the
importance of individual members’ balances of payments for their domestic
stability and the external stability of the union, Article IV assessment of the policies
of a member of a currency union should always include an evaluation of
developments in its balance of payments.  Consistent with the purpose of forming
an integrated financial market where savings and investment decisions are
disconnected and where intra-union currency risk is absent, it was considered that
the thresholds at which balance of payments imbalances become disruptive are
higher in a currency union. Nevertheless, the possibility of balance of payment
pressures within a currency union was acknowledged and it was mentioned that
these pressures “may be either transmitted to the external stability of the union,
or reflected back onto the member in the form of a need for adjustment”12.
18 Although the conceptual framework provided by the 2007 decision with respect to
the concept of external stability in a currency union is sensible, its implementation
in the euro area may have been inadequate. The decision makes it clear that
external stability, the organising principle of surveillance, depends both on
exchange-rate stability of the union and on domestic stability of individual
members of the currency union. Yet by focusing on the external stability of the euro
area as a whole, surveillance of domestic stability seems to have ignored spillover
effects of country-level developments onto other euro-area members13. As the
nominal exchange-rate channel, which is prominent in the 2007 decision, was
absent, there was a tendency to overlook intra euro-area imbalances and the
balance of payments is close to equilibrium. While national economic situations are not stable, this absence of
domestic stability is not resulting in nominal exchange rate instability and is therefore not of concern for a narrow
interpretation of external stability.
14. Watson (2008) already noted in his report on IMF surveillance in Europe that “spillovers within the euro area also
need clarifying” (p21).
15. Watson (2008) already stressed that “the analysis of persistent imbalances and inflation in the euro area have
not been placed in a clear analytical framework and mapped convincingly to financial dynamics and adjustment
capacity at the level of the euro area.” (p4).
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possibility that national policies or developments could constitute a threat to the
stability of the partner countries and the union as a whole. The overall approach
therefore reinforced the original division of labour between national and euro area-
wide Article IVs and made it even more difficult for the Fund to focus on spillovers
within the area14.
19 In our view the concept of external stability is well-suited in the context of the euro
area, provided that other channels of instability, which do not involve the nominal
exchange rate, are recognised. What happened during the crisis is that some
national policies failed to comply with the objectives of internal and external
stability and this had negative repercussions on other euro-area countries and the
on euro area as a whole15. We will come back to this issue in the conclusion.
16. IEO (2011), IMF performance in the run-up to the financial and economic crisis, IMF surveillance in 2004-7,
Evaluation report, Washington D.C., International Monetary Fund. Also see, IMF (2009), Initial lessons of the crisis,
SPR-report. And IMF (2009), Initial lessons of the crisis for the global architecture and the IMF, SPR-report,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/021809.pdf.
17. 2007 Article IV staff report.
18. As evidenced by different interviews.
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3. Pre-Lehman IMF surveillance
of the euro area
20 IMF surveillance of the euro area suffered from similar problems to the IMF’s
surveillance in general before the crisis. The IMF's Independent Evaluation Office
(IEO) has highlighted the fundamental problems of IMF surveillance in the run-up
to the crisis in a recent report16. There was too much confidence in the inherent
stability of the private economy and the financial system. In Europe as in the US
there was the general mind-set that a better distribution of risk had reduced
volatility in the financial system. Light-touch regulation was the order of the day
and it was generally believed that monetary policy could deal with market
corrections (‘Greenspan-put’). For the Fund, it was very difficult to fundamentally
oppose this view and it also fell victim to it in its surveillance of the euro area. The
diagnosis of the underlying problems was often wrong, neglecting the feedback
loops in the financial system, the links between the real and financial economy,
and the systemic aspects of the financial sector. The build-up of leverage as well as
stock-flow problems were not sufficiently recognised. This report does not analyse
surveillance in general but focuses on the aspects of surveillance specific to the
euro area.
3.1 Surveillance of euro-area member states
21 For several member states of the euro area, the Fund issued strong and relevant
policy recommendations. For example, in the case of Portugal, strong warnings
about weak fundamentals were given17. This included clear warnings about weak
productivity, current-account deficits, private-sector debt, and the necessity of
significant adjustments to labour markets. These warnings were issued despite
significant pushback from national authorities18. In the case of Greece, significant
19. IMF (2006) Greece: report on observance of standards and codes – fiscal transparency module, IMF Country
Report No 06/49.
20. See Article IV report for Ireland of 2007.
21. Labour-market flexibility is an important issue in a monetary union; however, for Ireland it is far less important than,
for example, in Spain, putting into question the way priority areas are chosen.
22. See Article IV report for Greece of 2007, published in May 2008.
23. See Article IV report for Spain of 2007.
24. For example, the Article IV of 2006 for Spain has a major discussion of labour market reforms but this is virtually
absent in the 2007 report.
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problems in fiscal management were identified in a 2006 report19. Some issues in
Spain were also rightly identified. For example, the Fund issued warnings about
the risks associated with private sector indebtedness and general warnings about
lost competitiveness. In 2004, important warnings about the tax deductibility of
mortgages that were further fuelling the housing boom were given. Ireland was
warned about housing market bubbles.
22 However, the focus of surveillance sometimes appears arbitrary and important
issues were left untouched. National as well as euro-area Article IVs typically focus
on one or two core issues. It is unclear, however, how the focus was chosen, and the
choices in retrospect do not always reflect the most pressing policy priorities. In
the case of Ireland for example, labour-market flexibility was given significant
weight in the 2007 discussions20. This appears somewhat surprising given the
comparatively high degree of labour-market flexibility in Ireland compared to other
countries21. At the same time, the 2007 report gave banking sector problems less
attention than would seem appropriate in hindsight. In Greece, problems in the area
of fiscal management were downplayed in the 2007 report while they received
significant attention one year earlier22. In Spain, there was little discussion of the
housing boom and of the implications of an end to this boom for the Spanish
financial system even in 2007. The problems of exceptionally high tax revenues
due to a boom in tax-rich income bases were hardly mentioned23. Instead, the 2007
Article IV discusses the question of fiscal discipline in a decentralised economy at
great length.
23 Follow-up of previous policy recommendations was not always ensured. In Greece,
the important 2006 findings about public accounting did not find their way into
the subsequent Article IV reports and did therefore not have the effect they could
and should have had. In other euro-area countries, major findings in one year were
not followed-up in the following year24. A frequent explanation given for this pattern
is that the IMF did not want to make policy discussions overly repetitive and
instead aimed to bring in fresh ideas. While this is certainly an important concern,
it does not justify leaving out major policy problems identified earlier. In fact, such
25. As stated by several interviewees.
26. See for example, Article IV for Germany of 2007 and 2004, FSAP 2003 for Germany.
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omissions could be perceived by national authorities as a sign that the problem
had in fact diminished.
24 The Fund did not exploit its comparative advantage deriving from international
experience with crisis-prone countries. In many respects, crises in emerging
economies show similarities to current problems in some euro-area member
states. The Fund was the institution best placed to recognise that credit booms,
large current account deficits and large external indebtedness are eventually
associated with significant turbulence. It had a clear comparative advantage with
respect to the institutions responsible for EU surveillance. However the Fund fell
victim to the mind-set that 'Europe is different'. It may also have been encouraged
to tone down its doubts because of the weight of European countries in Fund
governance25.
3.2 The euro-area dimension of surveillance
25 Economic linkages in monetary union were not systematically taken into account.
The analyses performed in national Article IVs rarely took into account the fact that
policy action in an integrated economic area has direct consequences for other
members of the euro area. Typically, the assumption made was that the euro-area
context should be taken as given. While this is a useful approximation for the very
small members of EMU, it is not a useful approach for the large economies and
medium-sized economies. For example, policy action in Spain has direct
implications for Portugal but this is rarely alluded to in either the Spanish or the
Portuguese Article IVs. Problems in the governance of German public banks were
raised26, but the link between these governance problems and the fact that
Landesbanks may have fuelled harmful borrowing in other parts of the euro area
was not made.
26 The Fund’s surveillance failed to take account of the implications of being in
monetary union. Before the foundation of EMU, Fund discussion about the benefits
and costs of being part of a monetary union were framed by the theory of optimal
currency areas. After EMU foundation, central insights of this theory were not taken
into account in the IMF surveillance. The Fund's structural policy advice to its
members was general but almost never referred to EMU. For example, while labour
market reforms were being called for in several countries, the Fund did not
underline that in a common currency area such reforms are particularly needed to
27. See for example Article IV reports for Spain and Portugal.
28. For example, high growth rates in Ireland were not identified as unsustainable even though they could not be
explained by catching-up processes – Irish GDP was already far above the euro-area average. While paragraph 2
of the report sounds some warnings about the construction boom, the main message from paragraph 1 is high
growth that is justified by fundamentals.
29. In the same vein, the interpretation typically failed to acknowledge that despite weak competitiveness,
employment was high, suggesting strength of labour demand rather than a lack thereof.
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facilitate adjustment27. Growth dynamics that inherently resulted from the low real
interest rates and the resulting excessive domestic demand were not identified as
being unsustainable28.
27 Divergences in monetary union were typically interpreted in a narrow way based
on a trade view. Divergences in the euro area in terms of current accounts were
almost exclusively understood as resulting from trade and competitiveness
developments, thereby neglecting the financial dimension of the problem. Current-
account divergences were typically looked at from the point of view of trade flows
and competitiveness. Typically, it was argued that competitiveness losses
produced the observed trade-flow imbalances. This analysis ignored the underlying
financial flows and also failed to see that trade imbalances were often not driven
by weak export performance but rather by strong import dynamics due to buoyant
domestic demand29. While current account divergences and the resulting
deterioration in net foreign financial asset positions was often mentioned in
national Article IVs, the general line was that this would not constitute an
immediate concern. The main reason given for this position is that in monetary
union, funding for external deficits cannot dry up.
28 The link between capital inflows and systemic risk was ignored. The large capital
inflows to countries such as Spain and Ireland led to the build-up of significant
financial risk. This risk was often not properly identified. For example, in the case
of Ireland, national Article IVs failed to issue warnings on the vulnerability of the
banking system and basically relied on the assessment of national authorities in
this regard. Better data may have allowed more pertinent warnings to be issued.
The interconnectedness of the financial system and the implications of national
instabilities for the euro area financial system were not highlighted.
29 The vulnerability arising from the link between high debt and competitiveness
adjustment was not identified. In monetary union, the basics of debt dynamics
change as countries forgo monetary policy and the exchange rate as adjustment
tools. A country with a high debt-to-GDP ratio and low competitiveness faces the
challenge that adjusting competitiveness increases the real burden of debt. As a
consequence, the market tolerance of what constitutes a sustainable level of debt
30. See also Wagner, Nancy (2010) ‘IMF performance in the run-up to the crisis: bilateral surveillance on selected
IMF member countries’, IEC Background Paper BP 10/03. In some other countries, the assessment is probably
different.
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is therefore likely to shift downward after what has been a learning experience. The
Fund failed to warn about the potentially negative implications of having high debt
and competitiveness adjustment needs.
30 FSAPs existed on a national level only and were not designed to be used as a
warning tool. FSAPs did not warn appropriately and early enough about the risks in
the financial system in some cases30. In the case of Ireland, the FSAP of July 2006
failed to spot the risks in the financial system. The Spanish FSAP of summer 2006
was more helpful in this regard and integrated real economy and financial
developments with more success. Despite the Fund’s concerns about the financial
architecture of euro-area financial supervision, the FSAPs were not integrated
across euro-area countries to take account of the strong financial links. There was
no desire on the part of the EU to let the Fund perform an FSAP at the level of the
euro area. An EU FSAP is currently being designed and scheduled for 2012.
31 Multilateral surveillance provides useful guidance for national surveillance, but
can spot national problems only in general terms. The WEO and GFSR are excellent
publications to form a view about global trends and developments. They include
regional analysis that identifies broad trends. For example, the October 2007 WEO
sounds some warnings about the implications of global tightening on housing
markets and also points to competitiveness problems in some euro-area countries.
It also points to potential vulnerabilities in the banking system. These warnings
are too general to be suited for country-level policy action but constitute important
messages to frame debates. The Regional Economic Outlook for Europe, which is not
an official surveillance document, started only in 2007 and moves in the direction
of providing more detailed analysis that can more directly shape policy action.
However it does not attract much attention from policymakers at the senior level. 
32 Weaknesses in the governance framework of the euro area were not fundamentally
criticised. Before the euro was introduced, there was much debate regarding the
institutions necessary to ensure that a monetary union would be viable. This
debate was fuelled by leading economists from the US and Europe. It was very
present in the Fund, and IMF research contributed significantly to it. Once the euro
was introduced, however, the Fund stopped taking into account lessons from this
debate. It is certainly a difficult balancing act to point to weaknesses in the
governance framework of the euro area without fundamentally questioning the
project of the euro itself. The Fund, however, chose to remain mostly silent on the
31. See, for example, EA Article IV staff report of 2007, p19.
32. By which it is meant that member states are looked at separately from each other. In addition, because of the
described problems with the mandate, insufficient attention was given to the external indicators such as external
debt and balance of payments deficits.
33. IMF (2006) ‘Greece: report on observance of standards and codes – fiscal transparency module’, IMF Country
Report No 06/49.
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governance issue. It pointed to the weakness and problems of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP), especially when it was reformed. However, it did not
fundamentally raise the issue of missing surveillance in areas other than the SGP
and did not raise the question of fiscal integration.
33 In the area of financial supervision and resolution, the Fund played a leading role
in emphasising the relationship between monetary and financial integration and
it pushed for progress towards more policy integration. The Fund called on the euro
area to improve its governance of cross-border banking groups, to make provisions
for resolution of cross-border crises and to address the question of ex-ante burden
sharing and supervision. While the push was often framed in terms of cross-border
banks, the Fund clearly also had large banking groups and their spillover effects
in the focus of analysis31. Thus, in the area of financial integration, the Fund did
warn European policy makers of the inadequacy of the system in place. 
3.3 Institutional issues
34 Surveillance was process-driven rather than analysis-driven and had difficulties
coping with the set-up of EMU. In addition to the economic mind-set, the way the
surveillance was structured hampered effective surveillance. IMF surveillance
continued to be structured in the same way as for countries outside of a monetary
union32 whereas euro area-wide surveillance largely mimicked European
processes.
35 As a result, national and euro area-wide follow-up of recommendations was not
sufficiently integrated. The different national surveillance processes were not
linked to each other to reflect interdependence within the common currency area.
Policy recommendations developed in the euro-area Article IVs were rarely
translated into concrete country-specific policy advice. Conversely, problems
identified at the national level were not generally brought to the attention of the
broader euro-area policy community. For example, warnings about the dismal state
of Greek public sector management and fiscal reporting were raised with Greek
authorities (eg in the 2006 technical assistance report33) but the IMF did not
undertake to warn the Eurogroup or EU institutions that a significant problem
34. EA Article IV reports rarely become specific on member states.
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existed34. Conversely, broader trends in terms of monetary policy and the euro-
area exchange rate were not systematically translated into advice relevant at a
national level. For example, the implications of an interest rate increase, which was
discussed in the euro-area Article IV, was rarely brought to the attention of national
policymakers in countries where there was a significant proportion of variable-rate
mortgages, such as Spain and Ireland.
36 The euro-area Article IV missions and reports were generally felt by European
policymakers to be of little help, mostly due to their set-up. Euro-area Article IVs are
typically quite general and only discuss some broad trends. Major concerns such
as intra euro-area macroeconomic divergence were not raised as a significant
problem until the 2008 Article IV. The role of the euro area in the global economy was
typically covered but in rather general terms, essentially referring to the current
account balance and whether or not the exchange rate was in line with
fundamentals. Several interview partners in Europe argued that they felt that the
analysis and tone of the euro-area Article IVs was too close to the official line of
the Commission and the ECB. This makes it difficult to see exactly where the added
value lies.
37 A fundamental difficulty of surveillance of the euro area is that a clear counterpart
to the Fund is missing. The weakness of the euro-area Article IV appears to reflect
the problems inherent in the complex governance of the euro area. In fact, in the
absence of a clear central decision making entity (except for the ECB), the Fund
faces a large number of interlocutors. Moreover, the Fund needs to have a view on
who are the most relevant partners in the euro area with whom surveillance
discussions can be most effectively held. In the euro area today, it can be argued
that the identity of the best counterpart shifts relatively quickly depending on the
problem and on domestic and European credentials. Indeed, on several occasions,
the Fund warned that the euro area needed stronger internal governance.
38 Close relationships between the Fund and the authorities, as well as downsizing,
reduced the effectiveness of the Fund as an independent and critical observer.
Fund officials in many instances had very close contacts with European officials.
Many interview partners remarked that this drew the Fund into the European policy
game too much, making it more difficult to exploit its comparative advantage and
to carry out independent, process-free economic analysis. The Fund placed
excessive focus on fiscal policy and neglected private-sector vulnerabilities, much
in the same way as the EU’s own institutions did in their surveillance. In addition,
35. As stated in an interview. In programme mode, many more resources are available to carry out investigations.
36. As stated in several interviews.
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the Fund underwent a period of significant staffing cuts during the period we
survey and the effects of this downsizing should not be underestimated.
39 A combination of self-restraint and resource constraints may also explain why
the Fund failed to detect the full extent of Greek misreporting of public accounts.
Problems were spotted, and in programme conditions, Fund staff would certainly
have been able to uncover the extent of misreporting. Surveillance teams, however,
probably lacked the authority and the resources necessary to carry out the further
investigations35.
40 The collaboration between staff and executive directors was not always smooth.
European executive directors were sometimes found to be more critical than staff
and, pushed for greater integration of analysis. Our reading of different board
meeting minutes, as well as the interviews we conducted, indicate that on
occasions, executive directors appeared aware of linkages and often also came
forward with a common view on issues, via the EURIMF presidency in particular.
The executive board was not always active in response to events. For example,
there was no board discussion after the release of revised Greek data. Moreover,
staff often felt that executive directors were pushing them back on several issues,
by calling in staff members and lecturing them36. Overall, the relationhip between
staff and executive directors could be strengthened and made more effective.
4. IMF surveillance of the euro
area during the crisis years
41 IMF surveillance of the euro area became more intensive during the crisis years
(2008-10) and often took on a different form than in earlier years. The frequency
and importance of events in the last three years was unprecedented. The IMF
acknowledged that an annual surveillance cycle would not do justice to the
enormous task. It therefore increased the frequency of interaction with national
and EU authorities at all levels and helped shape the policy debate in Europe. The
frequency of the WEO and GFSR publications was increased while many informal
and formal processes and links were established to supplement the standard twice-
yearly Article IV missions.
42 The Fund quickly changed its approach to the euro area recognising the nature
and magnitude of the problem. While in the pre-Lehman period, the general
approach to the euro area was framed by a 'Europe is different' mind-set, from early
2009 onwards the Fund pointed to the problems of the euro area with increasing
urgency, including the substantial interconnectedness of problems across
countries. For example, the Fund quickly pointed out that financing of current
accounts could become an issue in the euro area. The surveillance of the euro area
thus became more realistic in terms of the challenges facing its economies.
43 This stepped-up surveillance was a welcome adaptation to changing
circumstances but complicated the task of carrying out an external evaluation.
Indeed, as surveillance increasingly took an oral form or was carried out through
unpublished documents, it is difficult for the authors of this report to form a
comprehensive view of IMF surveillance during the crisis.
44 Besides the regular surveillance documents, we therefore decided to focus our
evaluation on four key topics of great relevance for the euro area. In particular, we
focus on (i) the advice on the macroeconomic response to the crisis, especially
the fiscal stimulus in 2008-10, (ii) the advice on dealing with the stress in the
banking system in general and in Ireland more specifically, (iii) the advice on the
22
crisis management and resolution framework (iv) the advise on the governance
reform of the euro area. The IMF has been very supportive in our quest to form a
comprehensive view on these events going beyond the publicly known documents.  
4.1 Regular surveillance during the crisis years
45 Regular surveillance of euro-area countries with difficulties became more relevant
during the crisis years. Awareness of the fundamental problems that some euro-
area countries face increased significantly. IMF analysis also became more
relevant, pointing to the bigger problems. In Portugal, the combination of low
productivity, weak competitiveness and high debt was rightly identified, and the
urgency of keeping control of public finances was adequately stressed (Article IV
of January 2010). In Ireland, the focus of surveillance shifted to the problems in the
banking system and the need to separate banking sector woes from the sovereign.
With the benefit of hindsight however, the staff report appears to have been
somewhat optimistic about the prospects of dealing forcefully with such problems
(Article IV of June 2010). In Spain, the issue of labour-market reform and
consolidation of the banking sector was more forcefully raised. There is also an
extensive discussion of private-sector balance-sheet adjustment needs (Article IV
of July 2010).
46 Nonetheless, the urgency of problems in Greece was not properly captured in the
regular Article IV of 2009. In Greece, warnings about the need for fiscal
consolidation were somewhat stepped up in the report of August 2009. However,
the report mentions public-sector data problems only in passing and does not
properly assess the risks stemming from further market pressure, taking a benign
view that these pressures would be receding. The report is upbeat about the
measures taken to stabilise the banking system but failed to account for the
exposure of the banking system to the sovereign itself. With hindsight, the banking
sector assessment was probably also overly optimistic given the later agreement
to include a bank stabilisation fund in the Greek assistance programme agreed on
in May 2010.
47 The quality of the analysis and policy recommendations increased, but the
structure of formal surveillance remained an obstacle to an integrated
assessment. The euro-area Article IV staff report of July 2010 points to the
fundamental problems underlying the construction of the euro area in clearer terms
than before the crisis and overall is very much to the point. We discuss some details
of the euro-area Article IV’s core messages in sections 4.4 and 4.5. However, regular
surveillance during the crisis followed the same organising principles as before
23
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37. As already noted by Watson (2008) there is always “some unease about Fund assessments of monetary policy
in the euro area – seen by some authorities as failing to pay sufficient regard to the ECB’s specific mandate” (p3).
38. The managing director called in January of 2008 in Davos for a new fiscal policy as an accurate way to respond
to this crisis.
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the crisis. As before the crisis, national Article IVs remained the core of the
surveillance of the euro area. The euro-area Article IV is an additional document
with a focus on institutional issues, which does not (and does not intend to) take
up specific problems in individual member states.
4.2 Macroeconomic policy response
48 The IMF appropriately assessed the macroeconomic risk to the global economy.
The Fund pointed to the severity of the financial crisis and its implications. It rightly
emphasised that the global deleveraging process had strong implications for global
demand, and that together with the risks in the financial system and the trade
decline, a repeat of a global Great Depression was a distinct possibility. In view of
this global risk, the Fund urged countries around the globe to enact significant
demand-side policies.
49 As regards monetary policy, the right course for action was debated in the summer
of 2008, with the Fund making a positive contribution. While Fund staff noted that
indicators of inflationary pressure and activity would likely soften, thereby
justifying an easing of monetary policy, the ECB pushed back strongly on this,
arguing that wage pressure was building up37. The ECB decision to tighten in July
2008, which in retrospect can be judged a mistake, was therefore assessed as not
appropriate by the IMF. The IMF thus played a positive role in sounding a warning
on the downside risks to the euro-area economy. The staff report maintained this
scepticism about the monetary tightening, and stated that the case for keeping
rates on hold was “compelling”.
50 As regards the aggregate fiscal policy stance, the IMF advice given to the euro
area was appropriate and timely. The Fund urged euro-area economies to enact a
significant fiscal expansion. This policy advice was appropriate given the risks to
the global economy. The IMF was among the first institutions to understand the
severity of the crisis and to call for a strong macroeconomic policy response38. The
advice helped to significantly shape the debate in the euro area on fiscal policy.
51 However the Fund did not sufficiently differentiate its advice on fiscal expansion
for the different euro-area countries, thereby contributing to the build-up of
vulnerabilities. The Fund made the general point that fiscal policy needs to be
39. See for example interview ‘Transcript of a Conference Call on the November 2009 Cross-Country Fiscal Monitor,’
with Carlo Cottarelli, Fiscal Affairs Department Director, November 3, 2009, Washington DC. Available at:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2009/tr110309.htm.
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differentiated according to fiscal space. While the advice for the euro-area
aggregate was appropriate, the differentiation message was not sufficiently broken
down across countries and remained general. In the euro-area Article IVs, message
on differences in fiscal space given in 2008 and 2009 were weak or absent. In the
case of Spain, even the April 2009 Article IV is rather cautious, and does not sound
a clear warning on fiscal difficulties. The risks stemming from implicit liabilities in
the financial sector are not mentioned prominently either. In its assessment, the
Fund also missed the fact that fiscal revenues in Spain were artificially high before
the crisis and that the structural deficit was correspondingly larger, and
significantly so (see Box 2 on the next page). This could have been seen in real
time. Only in the late autumn of 2009 did the Fund shift direction and become
much more cautious on fiscal policy39. By May 2010, very strong warnings were
issued: deep and frontloaded fiscal policy retrenchment measures were called for,
and it was recommended that budget plans be based on more prudent
macroeconomic forecasts.
4.3 Advice on the diagnosis and treatment of distressed banks in the euro area
52 The IMF played a positive role in the surveillance of banks in the euro area in the
crisis years. Soon after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the IMF pointed to the
significant problems in the euro-area banking sector and to the need to forcefully
tackle the underlying problems. A number of facts can be brought forward in this
regard.
53 The IMF was the first institution to publish estimates of potential write-downs in
the European banking system, thereby raising awareness of the problem. The IMF
was criticised for the publication of these estimates, and some commentators at
the time remarked that publication could result in self-fulfilling prophecies. This
criticism can, however, be dismissed. The write-downs on loans and securities were
certainly driven by fundamental factors as the real economy corrected and the
publication of such estimates significantly increased transparency. By publishing
the numbers, the IMF significantly contributed to increasing public awareness of
the underlying problem. This does not eliminate the fact that limitations in terms
of access to data reduced the accuracy of the estimates.
54 While the overall estimates were too pessimistic, this mistake derived mostly from
securities. The estimates of total losses in April were far too large. However, in
BOX 2: REVENUE WINDFALLS IN SPAIN AND THE ELASTICITY PROBLEM
In 2008, the IMF expected Spain to enter a recession in 2009, with a decrease in
GDP of 0.3 percent. On the surface, this would call for fiscal stimulus. However, the
deficit was 12.3 percent of GDP in 2009 and the magnitude of the recession was
larger with GDP falling by 3.8 percent. This large increase in the fiscal deficit cannot
be explained by the drop in GDP alone given normal elasticities. Instead, it is
indicative of special factors that had artificially increased the revenue elasticity
before the crisis and led to a collapse of revenues in the recession. In fact, IMF
research had pointed to the problem of revenue elasticities much earlier40.
In 2008, the structural balance and the stability of revenues were wrongly assessed.
Structural revenues were deemed to be higher than they actually were. Could and
should the IMF have detected that revenues were artificially boosted by booms in
revenue-rich tax bases? To answer this question, we distinguish two periods in
Spain’s economy: 1986-99 and 1999-2007. The first covers the period between
Spain’s EU entry and its entry into Monetary Union. The second covers the period of
EMU of low real interest rates until the collapse of the housing bubble in 2007. We
run a structural break test based on a CUSUM test41. The result is summarised in
Figure 1. This test detects elasticity instability when the cumulative sum of the
recursive residuals goes outside the two confidence intervals. The structural-break
test reveals that the revenue elasticity to GDP became unstable in about 1999. When
estimating the elasticities of the fiscal receipts with respect to GDP in the two sub-
periods, we find that the revenue elasticity was greater in the second period, with the
difference being statistically significant at a 5 percent level.
The results are derived from the regression: log(FR) = α + β*log(GDP) + U
FR is the fiscal receipts, α is a constant, β is the elasticity of fiscal revenue with
respect to GDP, and U the error terms. Data is taken from the World Economic Outlook
(WEO, 2011).
Table 1 summarises the results.
IMF fiscal policy advice did not take into account the possibility that these high
40. Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) ‘Boom-bust phases in asset prices and fiscal policy behaviour’, IMF Working Paper
04/54.
41. The CUSUM test takes the cumulative sum of recursive residuals and plots its value against the upper and lower
bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval at each point.
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revenues could in fact be due to the major housing boom and the rise of domestic
demand over and above that of GDP. This led to an over-estimation of Spain’s ability
to generate enough income even in a period of crisis and could therefore partly
explain the call for undifferentiated stimulus on the expenditure side. The results
also show that with the information available in 2008, a more cautious approach
would have been warranted.
Figure 1: Test of the stability of Spain’s fiscal elasticity
Table 1: Estimation results
The dependant variable is the logarithm of fiscal revenue; estimation method: OLS
(1) (2)
GDP (in logs) 1.09*** 1.15***
[0.028] [0.027]
Constant -1.52*** -1.94***
[0.168] [0.186]
Observations 14 8
R-squared 0.992 0.997
Base sample 1986-99 2000-07
Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01
Source for Figure 1 and Table 1: Bruegel.
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BOX 3: IMF ADVICE ON DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF DISTRESSED BANKS IN THE
EURO AREA
Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) estimates of potential write-downs in the
European banking system were first published in April 2009. Estimates were revised
in each GFSR until October 2010, after which no further revisions were added and
publication was discontinued.
Table 2 gives the evaluations published in the successive GFSRs (note the data are
in current dollars, so not corrected for exchange-rate changes). The first estimate for
the euro area and the UK proved to be over-pessimistic, however it should be noted
that this was presumably attributable to an exaggeration of estimated losses on
the securities portfolio. Losses on the loan portfolio were in fact correctly estimated
when first published in October 2009. 
Euro-area and national authorities initially denied the accuracy of these estimates.
Documents made available to the authors indicate that the Fund was harshly
criticised in spring 2009 by the ECB for having released inaccurate estimates, and
that there were still differences of view in spring 2010. Similarly authorities in
Germany and Spain initially took a more benign view than the Fund.
October 2009, the estimates were already corrected downward to reach a level
much closer to the final estimates. The main mistake derived from the estimates
of losses in securities. Estimated losses on loans turned out to be accurate (see
Box 3).
55 Consistent with the pessimistic estimates, the Fund rightly urged authorities to
conduct a thorough assessment and tackle the problems. The IMF all along urged
EU authorities publicly and privately to undertake credible stress tests. In
November 2010, after the Irish crisis proved that the first round of stress tests
conducted by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) had been
deficient, the Fund asked that the second round of CEBS stress tests be advanced
and that their credibility and transparency be enhanced. After the creation of the
European Banking Authority (EBA, the successor to CEBS) in January 2011, the
IMF provided a note to European authorities making concrete suggestions on how
to address the shortcomings of previous EU-wide stress tests. It also called on
national authorities to tackle banking sector problems by ensuring adequate
recapitalisation of viable institutions and orderly resolution of non-viable ones. 
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Consistent with its estimates, from 2008 onwards the Fund urged national
authorities throughout to conduct thorough assessments of the situation in their
banking sectors and to address weaknesses forcefully and comprehensively. This
was especially the case in countries such as Ireland and Spain, which were affected
by the bursting of the credit bubble42. Indeed, the banking issue featured
prominently in the 2009 and 2010 Article IV reports for Ireland and Spain.
The 2009 Article IV report for Ireland noted that the losses faced by banks up to the
end of 2010 could be about €35 billion, or about 20 percent of GDP, and it warned
that losses are likely to extend beyond the property-development sector as the
economy weakens and the design of the National Asset Management Agency
(NAMA) should incorporate that possibility. It also noted that “nationalisation could
become necessary but should be seen as complementary to NAMA”.   
In Spain, the 2009 Article IV report indicates that “Staff stress tests based on
published data suggest that banks may face capital needs – Bank of Spain’s results,
using detailed internal data, are more benign, but the authorities are not complacent
(...) Staff noted that there is a need for (fiscal) contingency plans to assist banks
with capital. The authorities viewed the severe scenario by staff as too pessimistic,
especially regarding the assumption of loan impairments rising rapidly to double
digit NPL-ratios”.
Table 2: Potential euro-area bank writedowns (2007-10)
$ billions April 2009 October 2009 April 2010 October 2010
Euro area 1109 814 665 630
- Loans 480 442 442
- Securities 333 224 188
Sources: IMF
GFSRs, April
2009-Oct 2010
Table 1.15, p70 Table 1.2, p10 Table 1.2, p12 Figure 1.13, p13,
and breakdown
provided by IMF
56 The IMF’s role in the discussion of the Irish bank guarantees and the subsequent
policy response including the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) is
limited. In the 2007 Article IV, the Fund essentially endorsed the Irish authorities’
view that the Irish financial system was sound. According to the available evidence
obtained, the IMF was not consulted prior to the introduction of the bank
guarantees in September 2008 (see Box 4). Internal IMF documents indicate,
however, that the staff were aware already in September 2008 that the size of the
guarantee to the Irish banking system could ultimately pose a problem of fiscal
sustainability.
BOX 4: IRISH BANK GUARANTEES
The boom in property prices and investment that took place in Ireland during 2003-
07 was fuelled by rapid credit expansion provided mainly by local banks, which in
turn relied heavily on international wholesale markets for funding. Although the
property sector probably passed its peak already in late 2006, it was not until the
shift in global financial markets during 2007 and 2008 that Irish banks started to
suffer. By early 2008, many had difficulties in maintaining access to the
international wholesale market. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, international
commercial funding for Irish banks came to a stop.
Acting on the belief that the main problem of domestic banks was one of liquidity,
rather than solvency, the Irish government put in place on 30 September 2008 a
two-year blanket guarantee of most of their liabilities (deposits plus covered bonds,
senior debt and dated subordinated debt), both existing liabilities and those issued
after its introduction. The guarantee scheme introduced in September 2008 is
widely regarded as having been ill-conceived42. Later that year the government also
provided capital to the banking sector to help it overcome losses on non-performing
property loans43. In April 2009 it established the National Asset Management
Agency (NAMA) to purchase bad land and development loans from banks.
The IMF was clearly not consulted by the Irish government before setting up its bank
guarantee scheme. The Irish financial authorities stressed repeatedly in September
2008 that Irish financial institutions were well capitalised and liquid with good
quality assets, having passed a rather positive judgment on the Irish banking
situation in its 2007 Article IV report, the last one issued before September 2008.           
Once the blanket guarantee was in place, there was little the IMF or others could do
to correct this 'original sin'. The 2009 Article IV report broadly supported the
September 2008 guarantee scheme, stating: “With banks facing liquidity pressures
and sizeable losses, the authorities have taken important steps to stabilise the
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42. In an influential article written in January 2009, Patrick Honohan, the future governor of the Irish central bank,
already remarked that “No public indication has been given that the authorities gave serious consideration to
less systemically scene-shifting – and less costly – solutions. For instance, they might have provided specific
state guarantees for new borrowings” rather than blanket guarantees for existing liabilities (Honohan, 2009).
43. See Lane, Philip R. (2011) ‘The Irish Crisis’, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8287.
financial system – through the blanket guarantee to depositors and creditors and
the recapitalisation of banks.” At the same time, the report warned that “unless
aggressively managed”, exiting from blanket guarantees “can be a long-drawn
process…[where] weakness of the financial sector, public finances and economic
growth can reinforce each other”. Although no specific advice was provided in the
report itself, we understand that specific recommendations were given.
The issue of bank guarantees resurfaced in November 2010 when the Irish
government requested assistance from the EU and the IMF. As explained by Lane
(2011), an important question in the negotiation was the appropriate scale of
burden sharing by bank bondholders in the recapitalisation of the Irish banking
system. Apparently there were about €32 billion in non-guaranteed bank bonds
outstanding at the time of the EU/IMF deal, including €20 billion of senior debt and
€12 billion of subordinated debt. These bonds were issued before September 2008
and benefited from the blanket guarantee until it expired in September 2010. The
deal envisages that holders of non-guaranteed subordinated debt would not be
repaid in full, whereas no such possibility was considered for holders of non-
guaranteed senior debt despite the fact that, according to press report, the IMF
seemed to have been open to this prospect. 
4.4 Advice on the design of the crisis management and resolution framework
57 Starting at end-2009 in the context of increasing pressure from sovereign bond
markets, the design of a crisis management and resolution regime for the euro
area emerged as a major challenge. The architecture of the euro area initially relied
on the primacy of crisis prevention (through the prevention and correction of
excessive deficit and other surveillance procedures). There were no procedures,
not even agreed principles for crisis management and resolution, and players in
Europe (especially member states, the Commission and the ECB) had different
interpretations of the EU Treaty, especially its so-called no bail-out clause. At the
same time the euro-area member countries remained individual members of the
Fund and as such were entitled to financial assistance in case of need. A major
challenge was therefore to design a cooperative crisis management and resolution
regime within the euro area. Beyond the specific European question, the broader,
strategic issue for the Fund was to define how to collaborate with a regional entity
while at the same time ensuring consistency and equality of treatment across
countries.
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44. See, especially, the Concluding Statement of the IMF Mission on Euro-Area Policies, 6 December 2010.
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58 The Fund was an active participant in the search for institutional solutions. After
an initial phase of hesitation, the Europeans determined that Fund involvement
was a necessary component of crisis management and resolution. The Fund
thereafter contributed actively to the European discussion, both through the direct
and active involvement of the managing director at ministerial and head of state
and government level or through staff contributions to the design of mechanisms
and procedures. The Fund provided a series of non-papers to European
policymakers, as well as oral advice on the design of new mechanisms. On several
occasions, it played a crucial role in fostering solutions in European decision-
making bodies such as the European Council and the Eurogroup. In national
debates, the intervention of the IMF also proved decisive in some cases. Leaving
out the programmes themselves, which are not covered by this report, key steps
were: (a) the agreement in April 2010 among euro-area member countries to
provide, jointly with the Fund, financial assistance to Greece; (b) the May 2010
agreement to create the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF); and (c) the
November 2010 decision on the creation of a permanent crisis management and
resolution framework for the euro area, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
59 In general, the Fund pushed for more comprehensive and bolder solutions than
the Europeans were willing to accept. In spring 2010, it supported the creation of
the ECB’s controversial Securities Market Programme. It also advocated the sharing
among euro-area member states of the burden of financing and adjustment costs;
a pan-European approach to bank recapitalisation; higher borrowing limits for the
EFSF/ESM; the possibility for the EFSF/ESM to engage in precautionary lending (in
parallel with the granting of a low-conditionality Flexible Credit Line by the IMF); a
broader mandate for the EFSF (giving it the ability to purchase debt securities on
the secondary market and to intervene in the recapitalisation of ailing peripheral
banks); and a more uniform approach to the seniority of official claims on
peripheral countries (it was critical of the decision of choosing mid-2013 as a cut-
off date)44.
60 Overall, there was a distinctive and positive Fund contribution to the European
discussion. First, the Fund brought the experience gained from crisis management
and resolution in the emerging world. Second, distance from European power
games allowed the Fund to play the role of an impartial umpire. Third, several
interview partners remarked that as the Fund was much closer to the market than
European policymakers, it was able to accurately point out the dangers building up
in the bond markets and the risks of contagion. While it is too early to pass a final
45. Evidence given by interviewees present at the EWG meetings.
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judgment on the success of the policy measures recommended by the Fund, its
positive role in raising the necessary awareness of the dangers of the situation
and in fostering initiative and cooperation in the search for responses is widely
acknowledged in Europe.
4.5 Reform of EMU governance
61 The crisis revealed significant shortcomings in the governance of EMU. First, fiscal
surveillance was not intrusive enough to diagnose and prevent the massive failures
of fiscal policy in Greece, and was not accurate enough to help avoid the build-up
of fiscal risks in Ireland and Spain. Second, financial market supervision was
insufficient and systemic risk was largely neglected. Third, macroeconomic
imbalances in the private sector were left essentially unchecked or unnoticed.
Overall, the perverse interaction between banking risk and sovereign risk that
characterises the current crisis was not adequately foreseen.
62 Starting in 2009, European policymakers decided to reform the governance of EMU
along three dimensions by overhauling financial supervision, revisiting fiscal
surveillance and introducing surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. In early
2010, a task force at ministerial level was established under the chairmanship of
President Van Rompuy to advise on reform priorities. The new system of financial
supervision has been in place since January 2011. The fiscal and macroeconomic
surveillance measures are at time of writing going through the legislative process.
The Fund did not contribute significantly to the decision on the priorities for
surveillance reform.
63 The IMF contributed to the governance reform of financial supervision. The new
European system of financial supervision with the new European authorities and
the European Systemic Risk Board was set up during 2009 and 2010. To our
knowledge, the IMF did not make high-profile interventions in these discussions,
by drawing parallels with financial supervision systems elsewhere in the world for
example. However, the Fund was an important political ally of the Commission in
the Eurogroup and the Euro Working Group (EWG) and helped convince hesitant
member states of the necessity to move ahead with the integration of financial
supervision45.
64 The IMF also contributed to the discussion on the fiscal reforms. Interviewees
remarked that the IMF had provided them with technical material on how to improve
the fiscal governance of EMU. This included documents on national fiscal councils
and concrete comments on the Stability and Growth Pact reform.
65 The Fund’s involvement in the debate on the design of a system for prevention of
macroeconomic imbalances was limited. The IMF is a key player in the discussion
on global imbalances and also takes an active role in shaping the global governance
reform debates via the G20. In the euro area, it left the issue of the governance of
macroeconomic imbalances mostly untouched. In the euro-area Article IV visit of
2010, the Fund remarked on some of the shortcomings in the design of the
European Excessive Imbalances Procedure. However, these criticisms were not
made sufficiently public and were also not brought to the attention of key decision
makers, such as those involved in the Van Rompuy task force. This limited the
overall effectiveness of the criticisms.
66 Overall, the IMF's involvement in the governance reform was limited. While the
Fund contributed to some aspects of the discussion – in particular regarding fiscal
matters – it made no comprehensive effort to influence the shape the overall Van
Rompuy package.
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5. Recommendations for
improving IMF surveillance of
the euro area
67 During the crisis, the Fund proved its capacity to provide first-rate policy expertise.
In its regular surveillance, advice typically became more relevant and outspoken.
On the four key topics discussed in section 4, Fund surveillance was clearly ahead
of the curve, in particular when compared to the European policy debate. This
suggests that its failure to detect vulnerabilities and warn about impending
problems in the pre-crisis period should be attributed either to an ill-defined
mandate or to the way surveillance was structured and organised within the Fund.
To ensure that it fulfills its surveillance mission more effectively and plays the role
its members expect from it, significant reforms are therefore required. These
reforms include revisiting the surveillance mandate, restructuring the surveillance
work and ensuring greater impact. Reforms along these three paths will be
necessary to better cope with the problems inherent in the surveillance of the
common currency area in Europe.
68 The steps to improve euro-area surveillance can be summarised in four points.
First, national and euro-area surveillance need to be better integrated. Second, the
surveillance mandate should be supportive and move away from an exchange rate-
centric model. Third, complementarity between IMF and EU surveillance should be
sought. Fourth, traction to IMF surveillance needs to be improved. These points are
discussed in the following subsections.
69 In adapting to the challenges of euro-area surveillance, it will be important that the
organisational structure is supportive. Surveillance is done by teams of
economists at the Fund who interact with officials in the countries of missions as
well as staff colleagues. The structure organising the interaction both within the
Fund and with euro-area officials is a key aspect of successful surveillance. It is
beyond the mandate of this review to make concrete suggestions about this
organisation. However, some key aspects are worth mentioning: well-structured
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interactions between key people of national Article IV missions are certainly of key
importance to form a clear view of the economic interdependencies of countries in
the euro area. Good collaboration across departments is also important. Staff
mobility patterns influence the depth of the level of analysis. Interactions across
IMF departments and the way specialised expertise is used outside of programmes
is also a key dimension for the effectiveness of surveillance. More frequent
interactions with officials are likely to increase the trust of national authorities in
the advice of the IMF staff, thereby increasing follow-up of recommendations. We
advise the Fund to review these various dimensions with a view to remedy the
deficiencies.
70 Euro-area surveillance should aim at taking into account policies and
developments in the EU as a whole. Besides the challenges identified above, euro-
area surveillance faces the challenge of operating within the EU overall framework.
Important policy areas such as competition and trade are organised at the EU level
rather than the euro-area level. Moreover, the EU's largest financial centre is outside
the euro area. Our report does not propose concrete steps of how this can be done
more effectively.
5.1 Revisit the surveillance mandate
71 Because of their explicit reference to exchange rate policy, the Fund articles of
agreement are a constraint on effective surveillance of countries in a currency
union. However, there is room for improvement both within the current legal
framework and by revisiting the 2007 decision.
72 Fund surveillance of the euro area should focus as a priority on threats to stability
of the area as a whole. Some countries in the euro area experienced a sudden stop
in 2010-11 which forced the ECB to substitute the money market in providing
liquidity to banking systems and EU-IMF assistance to substitute the bond market
in providing funding to governments. This sudden stop represented a major threat
to the stability of the euro area as a whole. The euro-area’s vulnerabilities exposed
in the open in the recent period are unlikely to vanish soon. On the contrary, the
years ahead are bound to remain challenging as a number of member countries
grapple with excessive debt, financial weaknesses, high unemployment and
misaligned real exchange rates. In this context it is more than ever necessary that
the Fund provides national and European authorities with a candid assessment of
the risks and frank policy advice.
73 A focus on internal dimensions should not preclude the Fund from assessing
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developments in the euro area’s relationship with the rest of the world. The Fund
has a clear comparative advantage in assessing the global interconnectedness of
the euro area. The new spillover report for the euro area provides a natural channel
for this part of surveillance. It should address the global implications of both
national and euro-area policies.
74 For these ends to be clearly defined and stated, a revision of the 2007 decision is
desirable. In the absence of such a revision, the Fund should at least formally
redefine its interpretation of its general mandate in the case of the euro area. This
revision should allow other channels of instability, as well as the exchange-rate
channel, to be properly taken into account.
5.2 Redefine the Fund’s relationship with the euro area
75 The Fund should not have a 'Europe is different' mind-set. Facts have proven that
countries in the euro area can experience crises of the sort that are frequent in the
emerging world. In its surveillance work, the Fund should make full use of its
comparative advantage, which consists of the breadth of its expertise, the wealth
of its experience across countries and over time, and an approach that is driven
first and foremost by economic analysis rather than by institutional constraints. In
recent years, the Fund has already moved in this direction and it will be important
to retain this attitude.
76 The Fund should take notice of the EU’s institutional constraints but it should not
be bound by them. The EU by nature is process-driven and this affects its own
surveillance work, which is structured around institutions and procedures.
Furthermore, European processes are inevitably affected by power games between
national governments and EU authorities (Council, Commission, Parliament and
ECB). Being outside of this game gives the Fund freedom and objectivity. These
are precious assets that should not be squandered by attempts to be part of the
European institutional game and to mimic European processes.
77 Attempts to limit the scope of Fund surveillance or to tone down its assessments
should be resisted. The Fund’s expertise and financial commitment to the euro
area give it a duty towards its entire membership to be as thorough and
comprehensive as needed. The claim that the euro area should be dealt with as a
single entity only has lost its justification.
78 While it may have been necessary in the context of the euro-area crisis and the
failures of European governance, the high-profile role of the IMF in the European
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decision-making cannot be a permanent approach. The Fund under Dominique
Strauss-Kahn played a crucial role in mobilising energies and breaking deadlocks
over important decisions for the euro area. This was appropriate in exceptional
times but can evidently not be sustained. An IMF that would become a permanent
player in the European institutional game would inevitably lose its ability to be a
trusted external adviser. It would also risk not being able to perform even-handed
surveillance. The Fund should therefore gradually revert to its normal role and take
full advantage of its external position. This does not mean, however, that traction
should be weakened.
5.3  Restructure surveillance work
This section first discusses proposals to restructure surveillance more generally along
dimensions useful for euro-area surveillance but also for other surveillance. It then
turns to the more specific factors related to euro-area surveillance.
79 Risk assessment should feature more prominently in surveillance work. In the
context of multilateral surveillance, the Fund has successfully developed an
approach to vulnerabilities and early warnings but bilateral surveillance is still very
much conducted in a first-moment framework. The added value of the Fund’s short-
term forecasts is questionable in the case of countries that are generally
well-equipped with public and private forecasting capabilities (and for which
Commission forecasts are also available). Rather, Article IV reports should borrow
from Early Warning/Vulnerability Exercise for Advanced Economies (EW/VEA)
methodology and results, and provide specific risk assessments. When doing so,
it will be important to carefully manage communication so as to avoid market
impact.
80 A more graduated approach to surveillance would be appropriate for dealing with
the situation of countries presenting evident weaknesses. Even-handedness does
not imply that the same amount of resources is invested in the surveillance of
strong and vulnerable countries. The Fund should give consideration to ways of
differentiating its approach depending on the perceived intensity of threats to
stability, especially as both the G20 and the euro area itself are moving
increasingly in this direction. For vulnerable countries, more in-depth and higher-
frequency investigations are desirable. To choose vulnerable countries, one could
use objective criteria thereby pre-empting criticism that Fund analysis is not even-
handed. This has been done before, for example when choosing the systemically
important countries for obligatory FSAPs. Bringing in technical assistance at an
earlier stage to those countries would improve the technical expertise necessary.
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The legal requirement that technical assistance can only be deployed at the request
of national authorities should be reconsidered. It could be replaced, for instance, by
the requirement that either national authorities or the Eurogroup make such a
request.
81 In fast-moving conditions, real-time reports by the staff should trigger discussion
within the Board and serve to alert authorities. Regular reports (annual if resources
permit) are indispensable, but the Fund should further improve the capacity to
react in real-time. Existing reports that come at a higher frequency, eg reports for
Board country-matter sessions, could be more effectively used for short-term risk
assessments.
82 The Fund should strengthen the financial side of the Article IV reports. The
separation of Article IV and FSAP reports has proved to be unhelpful because it
discourages full integration of financial dimensions in the Article IV reports. Instead
of perpetuating the twentieth-century schism between the real and the financial
economy, the Fund should allocate more resources in regular surveillance work to
an integrated analysis of real and financial developments.
83 The Fund should restructure its surveillance of the euro area and its members to
better exploit its comparative advantage. As a result of the crisis, surveillance by
European authorities (Council, Commission, ECB, ESRB, etc) is widening and
deepening. This does not mean, however, that IMF surveillance has no added value,
but it implies that its surveillance should be restructured. While national
surveillance remains at the centre of regular IMF surveillance due to its national
membership, integrating surveillance at national, euro-area and global level is the
unique advantage of the Fund.
84 Surveillance of the euro area as a whole and the euro-area Article IV report should
be upgraded. Instead of focusing primarily on issues of relevance for interaction
with EU institutions, euro-area surveillance should encompass all aspects of
relevance for the stability of the euro area, including national policies, in particular
countries and their spillovers onto other member countries. Results from the
surveillance of the individual member states should become an integral part of
euro-area surveillance and potential spillovers of policy developments to the euro
area should be strongly emphasised when assessing national policies in the
context of Article IV surveillance.
85 Euro-area and national surveillance should be closely coordinated. Coordination
should start at the ex-ante stage: surveillance teams should consult during the
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preparation for surveillance missions and coordinate on the choice of priority
issues, methodologies for assessment, major policy questions, etc, so that their
findings can be exploited on a cross-country basis or for the euro area as a whole.
Common themes for national surveillance could include, inter alia, capital flows,
competitiveness and the effectiveness of EU policy frameworks. Similarly, ex post,
major results of national surveillance should feed back into the on-going
surveillance of the other members as well as the aggregate, in a way that
strengthens the policy messages of relevance for the functioning of the euro area
as a whole.
86 National surveillance should focus on topics of importance for a country’s
performance within the euro area and potential threats to the stability of the euro
area. Topics should better reflect perceived priorities for analysis and policy reform
rather than the particular research interests and availabilities of IMF staff for
participation in missions. Policy issues of major importance for the stability of the
euro area should be clearly signaled in national Article IV reports. To achieve this,
one should reconsider staff-mobility patterns to ensure more in-depth knowledge
of the country.
87 To foster the better integration of national and euro-area Article IVs, an annual
'Euro Area Surveillance Report' (EASR) should be envisaged. This report should
draw on existing multilateral surveillance (WEO, GFSR, EW/VEA) as well as on
bilateral surveillance (Article IV reports for the euro area and national Article IV
reports) and the spillover reports. It should provide an assessment of risks arising
from developments in the euro area as a whole or in particular countries, and
highlight recommendations of major importance for discussion by euro-area
authorities and action by the EU, the Eurogroup or relevant national governments.
It should address all major areas of spillovers in the euro area and explore linkages
between the euro area and the rest of the world. The report would make reference
to the different Article IVs and would serve as a basis for subsequent national Article
IV assessments of links between national economies and the euro area as a whole. 
88 To avoid unnecessary duplication, one should consider discontinuing the euro-
area Article IV report in its current form and fully include it in the EASR. The Regional
Economic Outlook (REO), whose policy content is limited, could also be
discontinued and its analytical capacity could be used instead to reinforce the
EASR analysis of the interconnectedness across the area.
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5.4 Ensure greater impact
89 Technical improvements will be of limited effectiveness unless the Fund engages
policymakers at the highest level and communicates effectively with the wider
policy community. Partial evidence suggests that the report on euro-area Article IV
discussions has limited impact at best and that the impact of national Article IV
reports is very uneven across countries. The WEO and the GFSR are influential but
by nature communication about them focuses on the broad message for the world
economy, not on regional aspects. This is in principle the purpose of the REO report,
but it gets barely noticed in spite of qualities.
90 Traction should be improved by making the EASR the basis for the policy dialogue
of the Fund and European policy authorities at EU and national level. The EASR
would be presented by the managing director to the Eurogroup and the European
Parliament. This presentation could replace the current presentation of the narrow
euro-area Article IV, which failed to point attention to national problems of relevance
for the euro area as a whole. By doing so, the impact of national Article IVs would be
increased because peer pressure in the Eurogroup would be added as an additional
enforcement tool to the current obligations resulting from the bilateral Article IV.
The role of the European Parliament should not be underestimated, and the debate
on IMF surveillance would thereby be enhanced. The report would also increase
peer pressure on the EU institutions, thereby increasing the effectiveness of their
own surveillance. As the report would become a flagship publication, it will also
receive increasing attention from non-government players. This could be fostered
by targeted outreach activity, for example to trade unions and national parliaments.    
91 The Fund should press ahead with key messages on the prevention of major risks
as long as they persist. Having warned about a risk but having failed to insist on
the necessity of successfully addressing it is almost as blameworthy as not having
warned about it all. Again, these key risks should be highlighted in both the national
Article IV and in the EASR in order to maximise impact. Repeating key messages to
national policymakers is one major way of increasing impact. Repeating the same
message to euro-area peers will further increase peer pressure.
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Appendix I: List of interviewees
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Bayoumi, Tamim, Senior Advisor, SPR (Strategy, Policy and Review Department)
Blanchard, Olivier, Economic Counselor and Director, RES (Research Department)
Borges, Antonio, Director, EUR (European Department)
Chopra, Ajai, Deputy Director, EUR (European Department)
Claessens, Stijn, Assistant Director, RES (Research Department)
Cottarelli, Carlo, Director, FAD (Fiscal Affairs Department)
Dauphin, Jean-François, Deputy Division Chief, SPR (Strategy, Policy and Review Department)
Daniel, James, Division Chief, EUR (European Department)
Debrun, Xavier, Deputy Division Chief, FAD (Fiscal Affairs Department)
Decressin, Jorg, Senior Advisor, RES (Research Department)
Doyle, Peter, Division Chief, EUR (European Department)
Ducrocq, Aymeric, Alternative Executive Director
Everaert, Luc, Assistant Director, EUR (European Department)
Fayolle, Ambroise, Executive Director
Garcia-Martinez, Pilar, Commission advisor seconded to the EURIMF
Gibbs, Alex, Executive Director
Gulde-Wolf, Anne Marie, Senior Advisor, EUR (European Department)
He, Jianxiong, Executive Director
Kiekens, Willy, Executive Director
Kumar, Manmohan Singh, Assistant Director, FIN (Finance Department)
Laeven, Luc, Deputy Unit Chief, RES (Research Department)
Mauro, Paolo, Division Chief, FAD (Fiscal Affairs Department)
Mody, Ashoka, Assistant Director, EUR (European Department)
Moghadam, Reza, Director, SPR (Strategy, Policy, Review Department)
Mühleisen, Martin, Assistant Director, SPR (Strategy, Policy and Review Department)
Pineau, Georges, ECB Observer at the IMF Board
Poulain, Jean-Guillaume, Senior Advisor to Executive Director
Roumeliotis, Panagiotis, Alternate Executive Director
Sadun, Arrigo, Executive Director
Schaechter, Andrea, Deputy Division Chief, FAD (Fiscal Affairs Department)
Shannon, Michele, Division Chief, SPR (Strategy, Policy and Review Department)
Spadafora, Francesco, Senior Advisor to Executive Director
Strauss-Kahn, Dominique, Managing Director
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Towe, Christopher, Deputy Director, MCM (Monetary and Capital Markets)
Vegara, David, Assistant Director, WHD (Western Hemisphere Department), former Spanish
State Secretary
Viñals, José, Financial Counselor and Director, MCM (Monetary and Capital Markets)
Virmani, Arvind, Executive Director
Waysand, Claire, Assistant Director, SPR (Strategy, Policy and Review Department)
NON IMF
Ahearne, Alan, former Special Advisor to Minister of Finance, Ireland
Bergsten, Fred, Director, Peterson Institute
Berès, Pervenche, Member of European Parliament, former chair of ECON Committee
Bischofberger, Karlheinz, Head of Department Financial Stability, Deutsche Bundesbank, and former
Executive Director at IMF
Campa, José Manuel, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Ministry of Economy and Finance,
Spain
Deppler, Michael, former IMF Director (European Department)
Felke, Reinhard, Head of Unit, European Commission
Fernandez, Ramon, Director-General, French Treasury (French Ministry of Finance)
Grilli, Vittorio, Director General, Italian Treasury (Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance) and
Chairman of the EFC Committee
Henriksson, Jens, President, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, former Executive Director at IMF
Johnson, Simon, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute, and former Economic Counselor and Director of
RES at IMF
Kierkegaard, Jacob, Research Fellow, Peterson Institute
Le Houérou, Philippe, Vice President for Europe and Central Asia Region, World Bank
Leandro, José, Member of Cabinet of the President of the European Council
Leipold, Alessandro, Fellow, Lisbon Council, former Deputy Director of EUR at IMF
Meyer, Eric, US Treasury
Mussa, Michael, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute
Rajan, Raghuram, University of Chicago, and Former Economic Counselor and Director of RES at IMF
Reichenstein, Birgit, Federal Ministry of Finance, Germany
Renaud-Basso, Odile, Deputy Head of Cabinet of the President of the European Council
Schuknecht, Ludger, Senior Advisor (Directorate General Economics), European Central Bank
Sobel, Mark, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Monetary and Financial Policy, US Treasury
Stein, Klaus, Director, Federal Ministry of Finance, Germany, and former Executive Director at IMF.
Truman, Ted, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute 
Wieser, Thomas, Director General (Economic Policy and Financial Markets), Federal Ministry of
Finance, Austria, and former EFC Chair
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√∑tRMSE =           (Ft – Rt )2/n
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Appendix II
Forecasting performances: the
European Commission versus
the IMF
Objectives
This appendix compares the IMF’s and the European Commission’s fiscal-deficit and
GDP forecasts. Previous literature (eg Artis, 1997) establishes that the IMF’s World
Economic Outlook (WEO) forecasts are optimistic. Here, we assess if the forecasts
remained overly optimistic during 2005-10 compared to the European Commission’s.
Data definition and methodology
We focus on two variables: the fiscal deficit and the GDP growth rate. The GDP growth
forecast is the forecast of the annual percentage change of GDP in constant prices.
The fiscal deficit forecast is the forecast of the government balance one year ahead. We
focus on the four  countries covered by this report, ie Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain, and on the euro area as a whole.
We employ a simple methodology, the forecast error bias which we define as the
difference between the forecast value and the realised value. We use the root mean
square error (RMSE) to compare the two forecasts’ error bias (see the formula below).
The root mean square error measures forecast accuracy by comparing the forecasted
value with the realised value. Formally, it is given by:
F is here the forecasted value and R the realised value, n is the number of periods.
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Principles and organisation of forecasting in the two institutions
The forecasting process at the IMF is coordinated by the Research Department but the
forecast data is provided by area departments. The forecasts in the WEO database are
done by country teams (desks) within area departments, and their consistency is
assured by the RES department. At the European Commission, the Directorate General
for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) is responsible for the forecasts and it is
primarily done by the country teams (desks). Many economic forecasts are produced
using 180 variables. The main economic forecasts are published in May and November;
we chose the November forecasts.
The IMF through the WEO database also produces various forecasts. The WEO is
released in April and October of each year. We chose the October version to make it
comparable to the European Commission’s forecast, but it should be kept in mind that
the Commission has one more month of data.
Discussion of the results
It is very difficult to disentangle a general pattern from the untransformed data. Overall,
for the fiscal deficit and the GDP growth rate, the European Commission seems to
forecast better. In six out of ten cases, the Commission out performs the IMF. And when
the IMF performs better, the two forecasts are very close. The closeness between the
two institutions is measured by the ratio between the two root mean square errors.
The more the ratio is close to one, the more the two forecasts are similar (see, for
example, the fiscal-deficit forecasts for Portugal, and the GDP-growth forecasts for
Spain). Only in one case was the result different. This particular case is mainly
explained by the fact that the European Commission made a huge forecasting error of
the Greek deficit in 2009. The Commission forecast a government deficit of 2.2 percent
while the actual value was 15.6 percent. This huge gap explains the ratio 0.73 in the
Greek figure. The GDP growth forecasts, meanwhile, are very close. The IMF’s ‘under-
performance’ thus comes mainly from the fiscal side.
The IMF’s forecasting accuracy improved during 2005-10 relative to 1998-2005 (see
Tables II.A and II.B). During the first period (European Commission, 2007) it was clear
that the IMF performed worse compared to the Commission’s forecasts, whether
measured by the mean error, mean absolute error or the root mean square error for
the year-ahead outlook. So during the first period, according to the Commission
(2007), the IMF’s forecast errors were bigger than the Commission’s.
During the second period, the IMF’s performance seems to improve and become closer
to the Commission’s. For GDP growth, the WEO forecast errors are very close to the
Commission’s forecast errors46.
Source: Bruegel.
Source: European Commission (2007, p79) and Bruegel.
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46. It is important to highlight the fact that we compare here the two institutions by comparing their forecasts for
only two variables. As we said in the main text, these two institutions forecast more than 180 variables; a more
rigorous comparison would need to increase the number of compared variables. Our interest in these two variables
arises from the topic of this report.
Table II.A: Comparison of European Commission/IMF forecasts
Forecasting error bias (2005-10)
Government balance GDP growth
RMSE(EC) RMSE(IMF) Ratio(IMF/EC) RMSE(EC) RMSE(IMF) Ratio(IMF/EC)
Greece 6.66 4.85 0.73 2.27 2.35 1.04
Ireland 4.54 5.55 1.22 4.31 3.77 0.88
Portugal 3.23 3.02 0.93 1.44 1.46 1.02
Spain 3.99 5.25 1.32 1.78 1.66 0.93
Euro area 2.12 2.28 1.08 1.91 2.31 1.21
Table II.A: Comparison of European Commission/IMF forecasts
Forecasting error bias (1998-2005)
GDP growth – year ahead
Ireland Greece Spain Portugal
RMSE(EC) 2.88 0.54 0.95 1.19
RMSE(IMF) 2.69 0.59 1.06 1.18
Ratio(IMF/EC) 0.93 1.09 1.12 1.54
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An evaluation of IMF surveillance of the euro area
The euro-area crisis has exposed deep deficiencies in the governance of
European Economic and Monetary Union. However, crisis prevention in, and
surveillance of, the euro area are not only the responsibility of European
authorities. As members of the International Monetary Fund, all euro-area
countries are also subject to regular bilateral IMF surveillance. The currency
union as a whole is also subject to regular IMF surveillance.
This report analyses the IMF’s surveillance of the euro area. We find that it suf-
fered from severe shortcomings in the run-up to the financial crisis, but after
the start of the crisis in 2008, IMF surveillance of the euro area greatly
improved, with the IMF correctly proposing measures to counter depression
risks and warning about banking sector problems. By the time the sovereign-
debt crisis hit the currency union in early 2010, the IMF was ready to play an
influential role. The slow European response meant this was indispensable.
This study is based on interviews with high-level European, US and IMF
officials, and on IMF surveillance documents, focusing in particular on the
situations in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and in the euro area as a whole.
Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to international economics. It is
supported by European governments and international corporations.
Bruegel’s aim is to contribute to the quality of economic policymaking in
Europe through open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and
discussion.
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